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Post-9/11 Terrorism Threats, News Coverage, and Public Perceptions 
in the United States 
Commenting on Americans’ reactions to the attacks of 
9/11, Osama bin Laden said with obvious satisfaction, 
“There is America, full of fear from north to south, from 
west to east. Thank God for that!” Since then, bin Laden 
and other al Qaeda leaders have frequently warned of 
more devastating anti-American attacks inside and out-
side the United States. Well versed in the psychology of 
fear, terrorists know that violent incidents and the mere 
threat of terrorism in the aftermath of major strikes ac-
complish one of their primary goals – to intimidate their 
target publics and force governments to react and often 
over-react. 
Indeed, whether they actually stage or merely threaten 
violent spectaculars, terrorists win instant access to the 
news media. But government officials who are responding 
to terrorist attacks are also in excellent positions to utilize 
the media to enlist public support for their policies. 
Terrorists, decision-makers in targeted countries, and stu-
dents of terrorism have long assumed that not only actual 
terrorist attacks but also serious threats of such strikes can 
and do increase targeted publics’ fears and anxieties. 
Our research tests this conventional wisdom by examining 
the actual threat communications by Osama bin Laden and 
other al Qaeda figures, the alerts and threat assessments 
by President George W. Bush and members of his admin-
istration as well as the TV-network coverage of these pro-
nouncements and by comparing them with trends in the 
American public’s perceptions of threat in the post-9/11 era. 
There is a growing body of research on the importance and 
effectiveness of the media in the terrorist scheme to get the 
attention of and intimidate their various target audiences 
– friends and foes alike (Schmid and de Graaf 1982; Alali 
and Eke 1991, Paletz and Schmid 1992; Weiman and Winn 
1994; Nacos 1996, 2002). But with few exceptions (Kellner 
2005; Nacos 2002; Miller 1980; Crelinsten 1997) there is 
a dearth of sound research that illuminates the roles of 
Terrorists, policy-makers, and terrorism scholars have long assumed that the mere threat of terrorist strikes affects societies that have experienced actual 
acts of terrorism. For this reason, most definitions of terrorism include the threat of violent political acts against civilians. But so far research has neither 
validated this conventional wisdom nor demonstrated how actual and mass-mediated threat messages by terrorists and terror alerts and threat assessments 
by government officials affect the public in targeted states. This paper fills the gap providing evidence that who conveys such messages matters and that 
mass-mediated threat messages by al Qaeda leaders and announced alerts and threat assessments by U.S. administration officials had a significant impact 
on the American public’s threat perceptions in the post-9/11 years. 
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public communication, mass media, and public opinion 
in the politics of counterterrorism. As for public reaction 
to terrorism news, some researchers have concluded that 
exposure to television is less predictive of high levels of 
fear than are viewers’ personal characteristics (Rubin et 
al. 2003), but there is also evidence that heavy consumers 
of TV news are far more likely to perceive the threat of 
terrorism in the United States as high than are people who 
pay less attention to the news (Nisbet and Shanahan 2004). 
Moreover, recent research has demonstrated that individu-
als’ assessments of the terrorist threat affect their support 
for or opposition to counterterrorist policies (Nisbet and 
Shanahan 2004; Huddy et al. 2005; Kushner 2005). 
1. News as Predominant Source of Public Affairs Information
More than eighty years ago, before the advent of radio and 
television, Lippmann ([1922] 1997) observed that what peo-
ple know about the world around them is mostly the result 
of second-hand knowledge acquired by reading newspa-
pers. In modern-day mass societies, people are even more 
dependent on the news; they have “nowhere else to turn 
for information about public affairs and for cues on how 
to frame and interpret that information” (Neuman, Just, 
and Crigler 1992, 2). Even when individuals witness events, 
such as a devastating terror attack or massive anti-war 
demonstrations, or when people are affected by socio-
economic developments, such as high unemployment or 
increasing energy costs, they are still likely to depend on 
the news to explain the reasons, consequences, and politi-
cal significance of what they have experienced personally. 
As Page and Shapiro (1992, 340) put it, the public “often 
responds not to events or social trends but to reported 
events.” 
Decisions on what and whom to present in the news and 
how to present them are often influenced less by ideologi-
cal bias than by news organizations’ focus on authorita-
tive voices that they find at the most influential places of 
the executive branch. Administration officials dominate 
foreign policy and national security news, especially 
during international crises that involve the United States 
(Nacos 1990; Dorman and Livingston 1994; Cook 1994; 
Mermin 1999; Entman 2004). As Page and Shapiro (1992, 
367) pointed out before Americans became the targets of 
catastrophic terrorism:
In matters of foreign policy, the executive branch of 
government often controls access to information, and it 
can sometimes conceal or misrepresent reality with-
out being challenged. The political opposition is often 
intimidated or co-opted. Journalists, even when they 
are aware of what is going on, sometimes willingly hold 
back awkward truths in the name of “national security.”
2. Propaganda of Fear and Terrorism as Media Event
Nineteenth century anarchists and radical social reformers 
recognized that they were able to send powerful messages 
to audiences by committing violence; they therefore defined 
terrorism as “propaganda by the deed” or “propaganda of 
the deed.” Their idea was that terrorist strikes would drive 
fear into targeted societies and make them amenable to the 
revolutionary changes they sought. Spreading fear is central 
to terrorist and counterterrorist rhetoric and persuasion 
directed at audiences in whose interest the leaders of terror-
ist organizations and the governmental leaders of targeted 
countries claim to act. According to Pratkanis and Aronson 
(1991, 165), such fear persuasion is especially effective when 
it accomplishes the following, “(1) it scares the hell out of 
people, (2) it offers a specific recommendation for overcom-
ing the fear-arousing threat, (3) the recommended action 
is perceived as effective for reducing the threat, and (4) the 
message recipient believes that he or she can perform the 
recommended action.” Before and after 9/11, Osama bin 
Laden’s demagoguery aimed often not only to threaten 
Americans and Westerners but also to accomplish the four 
objectives of fear propaganda among potential sympathiz-
ers. President George W. Bush and his administration, too, 
made their fear appeals along the four propaganda objec-
tives in order to enlist broad public support for their post-
9/11 agenda. To be sure, not all fear appeals succeed – but 
in the face of violent events that rise to the level of “media 
events” or “media spectaculars,” the mass public pays atten-
tion to appeals that boil down to persuasion of fear. 
Communication scholars distinguish between commu-
nication as transmission and communication as ritual. 
Whereas transmission communication means disseminat-
ing information “farther and faster, eclipsing time and 
transcending space” (Carey 1992, 17), ritual communica-
tion refers to the “sacred ceremony that draws persons 
together in fellowship and communality” (Carey 1992, 18). 
108IJCV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 105–126Brigitte L. Nacos et al.: Post-9/11 Terrorism Threats, News Coverage, and Public Perceptions in the United States 
Communication as ritual has been discussed in the con-
text of terrorism with respect to what Daniel Dayan and 
Elihu Katz (1992) defined as “media events.” In its original 
meaning, a media event is televised live and preplanned 
(e.g., John F. Kennedy’s funeral, the royal wedding of 
Charles and Diana, Olympic Games) and in fact is co-pro-
duced by television networks and organizing governments 
or other public bodies. Considering terrorist spectaculars 
during the 1980s, Gabriel Weimann (1987, 21) suggested 
that “there are attributes shared by certain terrorist events 
and the conceptualization of media events.” More re-
cently, Elihu Katz and Tamar Liebes (2007) concluded that 
disruptive, threatening events, such as disaster, terror and 
war have actually upstaged the ceremonial “media events” 
and that terrorism events “are obvious co-productions of 
perpetrators and broadcasters” (Katz and Liebes 2007, 164). 
Unlike Weiman, Katz, and Liebes, Douglas Kellner calls 
the 9/11 attacks explicitly “shocking global media events” 
that were used by Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda on the 
one hand and President George W. Bush and his support-
ers on the other to advance their respective agendas and 
geopolitical designs (Kellner 2007, 25). 
Following the events of 9/11, it was President Bush who 
“articulated the escalating patriotism, vilification of the 
terrorists, and demand for stern military retaliation,” as 
Kellner (2006, 165) put it. The news media, too, followed a 
melodramatic storyline that pitted the victimized na-
tion against the ultimate villain. Based on a qualitative 
content analysis of Fox News on the afternoon of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, Anker (2005, 35) concluded, “Melodrama 
defined America as a heroic redeemer with a mandate to 
act because of an injury committed by a hostile villain.” 
While the virtuous nation and its heroes received copious 
and prominent news coverage, so did the villain-in-chief 
Osama bin Laden and those of his followers who killed 
themselves to kill thousands of innocent Americans. In-
deed, in the months following the 9/11 attacks, bin Laden 
received more attention in television news than President 
Bush (Nacos 2002). This high degree of attention to bin 
Laden’s messages of hate and threat fit perfectly into the 
story about “the evil-doer,” as President Bush called the al 
Qaeda chief, and the patriotic warriors dispatched to hunt 
down bin Laden and, later on, to remove another threat-
ening “evil,” Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, from power.
Both entertainment and news media have always paid 
extraordinary attention to violence regardless whether in 
the form of crimes or acts of terrorism (Bok 1998; Shana-
han and Morgan 1999). Especially in television network 
news and local news programs terrorism outpaced by far 
other important events, issues, and problems. According 
to Iyengar (1991, 27), “Between 1981 and 1986, more news 
stories were broadcast [by the three TV networks ABC, 
CBS, and NBC] on terrorism than on poverty, unemploy-
ment, racial inequality, and crime combined. Hijackings, 
hostage situations, and similar events have been embla-
zoned on the public consciousness.” Research has also 
established that both the volume of terrorism coverage 
and the placement of terrorism stories within a broadcast 
affect the public agenda (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Nacos 
1996): when the number of terrorism stories increased, 
the public’s perception of terrorism as a major national 
problem went up. Lead stories in TV newscasts proved 
even more potent in putting terrorism high on the public 
agenda. Although already over-covered in the 1980s, 
terrorism was far more in the news in the 1990s, when 
major anti-American attacks took place inside the United 
States (the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the 
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995) and abroad (the Khobar 
Towers bombing in 1996, the bombings of the U.S. embas-
sies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the suicide attack on 
the USS Cole in 2000). But the post-9/11 terrorism-related 
news outpaced all records previously set by high volumes 
of terrorism coverage. With terrorism high on the news 
agenda, the public followed the media’s lead. For the eigh-
teen months following the events of 9/11 Kern, Just, and 
Norris (2003) found a correlation between the number of 
terrorism stories in the three TV networks’ early evening 
news broadcasts and the public’s ranking of terrorism as 
the country’s most important problem. Our study covers a 
significantly longer time period.  
Research has also established that “[b]y calling attention 
to some matters while ignoring others, television news 
influences the standards by which governments, presi-
dents, politics, policies, and candidates for public office 
are judged” (Iyengar and Kinder 1987, 63). Moreover, the 
news also cues audiences to judge a president’s charac-
ter in the context of heavily and prominently covered 
events, problems, or developments. Given that American 
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presidents are widely regarded as the nation’s protectors-
in-chief and managers of major crises, one would assume 
that this priming effect of the media provides citizens with 
the news parameters within which they grade the perfor-
mance of their presidents in the face of terrorist strikes 
and threats. In the past, the approval ratings of presidents 
increased – often significantly – during and after terrorist 
incidents and in the wake of military responses to terror-
ism (Nacos 1996, 2002, 2006). 
3. Mass-Mediated Threat Messages and the Public: Three Hypotheses
Based on the literature in the field and our recollections 
of the news after 9/11 we expected our research to provide 
evidence for the following: 
(1) That threat messages from both Osama bin Laden and 
his closest associates as well as the Bush administration’s 
official terror-alerts and other threat messages were heav-
ily covered and prominently placed by the news media, in-
cluding TV newscasts. Since bin Laden and other al Qaeda 
leaders were in hiding and only able to communicate via 
audio and video tapes, we expected to find that President 
Bush and other administration officials were the domi-
nant news sources covered with respect to threat warn-
ings, right behind media personnel such as news anchors, 
reporters, and correspondents.
(2) That the news about the threat of further terrorist at-
tacks influenced how Americans perceived the severity of 
the terrorist threat to the United States in general, to their 
communities, and to their own well-being and that of 
their families in particular. We also expected to find that 
the overall volume of threat messages affected how the 
public ranked terrorism as a major problem the country 
was facing. 
(3) That Washington’s official terror alerts and the news 
coverage of them as well as other mass-mediated threat 
messages conveyed by administration officials affected the 
public’s evaluation of President Bush’s job performance 
in general and his handling of terrorism in particular. In 
the early months of the Iran Hostage Crisis in 1979–80, 
Iranians’ rhetorical attacks on President Carter and the 
United States contributed to the significant increases in 
Carter’s public approval (Nacos 1996, chapter 5); we there-
fore hypothesized that threat messages from bin Laden 
and others in the al Qaeda leadership would have positive 
effects on President Bush’s approval ratings.
4. Research Methodology and Data
Television news is the most important source of infor-
mation for the majority of the public. While the overall 
audience of cable TV news has steadily grown in the last 
decade, the nightly network news broadcasts of ABC 
News, CBS News, and NBC News still outpace by far all 
individual news programs on cable television. For this rea-
son, we chose the early evening TV newscasts of the three 
networks for our content analysis. Because the number of 
pertinent news segments was high, we did not work with 
full transcripts but coded abstracts available from Van-
derbilt University’s Television News Archive. Our reading 
of the abstracts indicated that they contained the basic 
information on reports about the threat of terrorism. We 
searched for segments that contained the terms threat(s), 
alert(s), or warning(s) in the context of terrorism for a 
thirty-nine-month period (October 1, 2001, to December 
31, 2004). We also searched for reports that mentioned 
messages, statements, or tapes as well as bin Laden or al 
Qaeda themselves. A close reading of a sample of abstracts 
and full transcripts of nightly network news convinced us 
that literally all of these bin Laden/al Qaeda messages con-
tained threats or warnings of future terrorist attacks. We 
retrieved a total of 373 relevant story abstracts, of which 
ABC News broadcast 32 percent, CBS News 34 percent, 
and NBC News 34 percent. We also retrieved a small num-
ber of newscast transcripts from the Lexis/Nexis news 
archives for a qualitative analysis of pertinent segments.1
In our quantitative content analyses we coded the network 
that broadcast a particular segment, the placement of 
each item as a lead or non-lead story, and the length of the 
1 Because the Vanderbilt TV news summaries pro-
vide the air times for each segment but the Lexis/
Nexis transcripts do not, we compared the length of 
news segments about changes in the official terror 
alert levels either in terms of minutes and seconds 
or word counts. 
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segment. Coders identified the sources of threat messages, 
such as the President, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
members of Congress, experts, members of the general 
public, foreign sources, Osama bin Laden, and media 
sources (anchors, correspondents, reporters, etc.), who 
have come to make up the bulk of news sources in both 
broadcast and print media (Nacos 1990, 1996). Finally, our 
coders categorized the type(s) of message(s) contained in 
each news segment: for example, increase or decrease of 
the national terrorism threat alert level; announcements of 
official threat warnings without increasing the color-cod-
ed alert scheme; and broadcasts of and reporting on bin 
Laden/al Qaeda. Given the fairly uncomplicated coding 
task, our coders achieved high reliability in their test cod-
ing. After a first reliability test in which our coders agreed 
in their coding of 90 percent of message sources and 82 
percent of the types of messages, the coders then achieved 
96 percent agreement for both in a second set of codings.
In addition, looking at the broader media environment, we 
searched open sources on the Internet for dates, abstracts, 
and transcripts of audio and videotaped messages released 
by bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders, and for state-
ments by U.S. administration officials alerting the public 
to specific terror threats or speaking of terrorism threats 
against the American homeland in more general terms. 
We coded these segments parallel to our TV coding, iden-
tifying the sources and categorizing the types of messages, 
in order to examine the effect of these mediated reali-
ties. Here, the British Guardian’s timeline of bin Laden 
tapes was helpful as were the online archives of the White 
House and the Department of Homeland Security. 
Finally, we retrieved public opinion survey questions about 
Americans’ fears, concerns, worries, and assessments of 
the terrorist threat as well as questions on President Bush’s 
overall and terrorism-specific approval rating from Sep-
tember 11, 2001 through December 31, 2005. It is worth not-
ing that a search for “terrorism” produced four hundred 
survey items (from the iPOLL archive of the Roper Center 
for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connect-
icut), during the whole of the more than twenty-one-year 
period from January 1, 1980, when the Iran Hostage Crisis 
made headlines, to September 10, 2001, the day before the 
9/11 attacks. But for the just over four years from Sep-
tember 11, 2001, to December 31, 2005, the same keyword 
search produced a total of 3,235 survey questions.2 From 
the iPOLL archive, the “Polling the Nations” archive, the 
Marist College Institute for Public Opinion, and several 
other polling institutions we collected identical questions, 
preferably asked by the same survey organizations and 
repeated over time, in order to determine short- and long-
term trends.3
In the retrieval process, we selected polls that revealed 
the public’s more general concerns about future terrorism, 
catastrophic terrorist attacks in particular, and how these 
perceptions related to their own communities and to them-
selves and their families. Out of thirty-five repeated ques-
tions through the years, we focused further on responses 
to seven questions dealing with: concern about terrorist 
attacks over different time horizons at the national level, 
terrorism affecting one personally, terrorism as most the 
important issue facing the country, and approval of Bush 
in general and in his handling of terrorism.4 
We used these questions to explore the relationship be-
tween public perceptions about terrorism, threat pro-
nouncements by al Qaeda leaders and U.S. administration 
officials, and the news coverage of such threats. 
5. Research Findings
5.1. Television News: Covering and Magnifying Terrorist Threats
“The United States is back on orange alert,” Dan Rather 
said at the top of the CBS Evening News on May 20, 2003. 
According to Rather, “President Bush today approved 
raising the national terror alert from yellow, meaning an 
elevated risk of a terror attack, to orange, meaning there 
is now considered to be a high risk.” In the following 3½ 
minutes Washington correspondent Bob Orr explained 
that officials in Washington “say they have no concrete 
information pointing to any imminent terror attack any-
2 Searching on “terror%” the corresponding numbers 
are 976 and 6,718 respectively.
3 When we had more then one time point in a 
month, we took a monthly average.
4 Complete question wordings and time points are 
available from the authors.
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where in the U.S. But it’s fair to say here in Washington, 
the level of worry is as high as it’s been since September 
11th.” After comments by Asa Hutchinson, the Under-
secretary of Homeland Security, and Randall Larson of 
the Anser Institute for Homeland Security, Rather asked 
CBS News Pentagon correspondent David Martin, “David, 
how imminent is a possible terror attack believed to be?” 
Martin’s alarming answer: “Very imminent, Dan, if you 
believe the intelligence, which consists primarily of inter-
cepted conversations among known al-Qaeda operatives 
talking among themselves about something big that is go-
ing to happen in the next two or three days.” Ten days later, 
Jane Clayson, sitting in for Dan Rather as anchor of the 
CBS Evening News announced, “In this country, the terror 
alert level, raised to orange after the attacks in Saudi Ara-
bia this month, was lowered today to yellow, elevated risk. 
The Department of Homeland Security says intelligence 
indicates the threat of an imminent attack has decreased.” 
Forty-three words in two sentences in a non-lead segment 
were devoted to inform the audience that there was less 
reason to worry about a terrorist attack compared to the 
642 words that were spoken to alarm Americans ten days 
earlier that there was an “imminent” threat of terrorism in 
the United States. ABC’s World News Tonight and NBC’s 
Nightly News covered these two official announcements 
in similar ways. On World News Tonight, the heightened 
terror alert of May 20, 2003, was dramatized by correspon-
dent Pierre Thomas who revealed:
An FBI bulletin obtained by ABC News points to two 
recent e-mails, intercepted by US intelligence. One mes-
sage warns of a possible devastating attack in the next 
48 hours and urged all Muslims to leave all cities, espe-
cially Boston, New York and the commercial coastline. 
A separate intercepted message targets Washington, and 
again points to possible attacks against New York and 
the nation’s beaches. The FBI made an immediate deci-
sion to share the e-mails with police across the country. 
In what followed, current and former federal and local 
officials then commented on the raised threat alert. In 
all, 734 words were spoken. When the official terror alert 
was lowered ten days later, Peter Jennings announced it in 
two sentences and twenty-five words: “The Department 
of Homeland Security has lowered its terrorist threat 
level today from orange to yellow. Ten days ago, you will 
recall, they raised it.” Over at NBC News, anchor Tom 
Brokaw introduced the comprehensive lead story by telling 
his audience that the decision to once again jack up the 
nation’s security alert had been made in the White House. 
Reporting from Washington, correspondent Pete Williams 
revealed that intelligence leading to the higher terror alert 
was received during the interrogation of suspected Al-Qa-
eda members arrested in Saudi Arabia after recent bomb-
ings in Riyadh; the segment then turned to Hutchinson of 
the Department of Homeland Security and New York’s Po-
lice Commissioner Raymond Kelly for comments. Finally, 
reporting from the State Department, Andrea Mitchell 
spoke about possible terrorist targets inside and outside 
the U.S. When the threat level was lowered ten days later, 
the Nightly News did not bother to mention the change. 
Figure 1: TV coverage of official terror alert changes by placement
Taken together, the three networks aired eighteen reports 
on the Bush administration’s decisions to raise the nation-
al terror alert level and fifteen segments on the lowering of 
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the color-coded alarm. In addition, the networks reported 
three times on raised terror alerts for New York and two 
times for other cities, while two newscasts mentioned the 
lowering of regional alerts. True to the media’s tendency to 
highlight shocking, sensational, disconcerting news, all 
twenty-three announcements of increases in the national 
or local terrorism alert levels were reported as lead stories 
(fig. 1). Conversely, ABC, CBS, and NBC reported de-
creases in these threat levels far less prominently airing 
only 13 percent of such announcements as lead stories and 
87 percent further down in their particular broadcasts. 
When the Bush administration raised nation-wide terror-
ism alerts, the networks devoted on average 5 minutes and 
20 seconds to such reports; when the national terror alert 
was lowered, the average news segment lasted only 1 min-
ute and 34 seconds (fig. 2). The difference was even more 
pronounced with respect to local threat alerts in that the 
average airtime for raised terror levels was 2 minutes and 
56 seconds versus only 20 seconds for segments reporting 
on the lowering of official terror alerts. When the three 
networks aired reports about official terror alerts and 
advisories that did not involve changes in the color-coded 
alert status, the average length of these segments was still 
2 minutes and 20 seconds. 
No doubt, then, that the news magnified the administra-
tion’s terrorism alerts by reporting such announcements 
mostly in lead stories and very long segments, while 
downplaying the new lower alert levels or not covering 
such changes at all. 
How did the networks cover the frequently released audio- 
and videotaped messages by bin Laden and his close as-
sociates? In the 305 instances, in which the release of a new 
bin Laden/al Qaeda message was reported or the content of 
these communications was analyzed, commented on, or re-
ferred to in the networks’ evening broadcasts, about half of 
these messages (51 percent) were contained in lead stories. 
When bin Laden/al Qaeda messages were not dealt with in 
lead stories, they were typically referred to or analyzed by 
experts, administration officials, other domestic actors and, 
on a few occasions, by foreign sources. The average length 
of news segments that contained bin Laden/al Qaeda mes-
sages was close to four minutes (3 minutes and 51 seconds). 
Only 25 percent of these explicit and implicit threat mes-
sages were translated statements by bin Laden and other al 
Qaeda leaders or summaries of these communications by 
anchors and correspondents, 6 percent were comments at-
tributable to foreign sources, and more than two thirds (69 
percent) originated with domestic sources responding to 
hostile remarks by al Qaeda’s leaders. In the TV newscasts 
we examined, 28 percent of President Bush’s statements 
concerning terrorism threats and alerts were reactions to 
communications by bin Laden or other al Qaeda leaders 
as were 22 percent of those by experts and 100 percent by 
CIA officials. This high degree of attention to al Qaeda’s 
communications is powerful evidence for the tendency of 
target societies to perpetuate the propaganda of their ter-
rorist foes and thereby, even if unwittingly, assist terrorists 
in their efforts to spread their intimidating messages. 
Typically anchors, correspondents, and reporters describe 
public affairs news, characterize the importance of events 
or developments, and paraphrase what political actors 
have stated. As a result, more information is conveyed by 
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media-based sources than by newsmakers and by those 
who react to and comment on whatever news unfolds. As 
figure 3 shows, this was also the case in the years after 9/11 
with respect to terrorism threat messages in that media 
personnel comprised 30 percent of the sources reporting 
on terror threats regardless of whether the warnings and 
threat assessments came from the Bush administration or 
from al Qaeda leaders. Administration officials accounted 
for 20 percent of all domestic and foreign sources with 
President George W. Bush (3 percent) and the Secretary of 
Homeland Security (4 percent) combining for 7 percent of 
all sources. Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge or 
other high officials in his department issued terror threat 
warnings and announced up and down changes in the 
color-coded terrorism alert system. But following adminis-
tration officials, terrorism and counterterrorism experts 
comprised the most often selected non-media group, 
accounting for 14 percent of all sources. This was hardly 
surprising because the television networks had signed 
these experts up in droves as news consultants after 9/11. 
While not identified as experts, former government offi-
cials (4 percent of all sources) and members of the military 
(1 percent) were actually also cast in the roles of experts. 
Although far less involved in the mass-mediated terror 
threat debate, members of Congress made up 4 percent of 
the total news sources.
When it came to reporting on terror threats, all three 
networks paid attention to ordinary Americans (8 percent 
of all sources) and offered them opportunities to express 
their feelings about the usefulness of such warnings. And 
whereas federal departments and agencies issued all threat 
warnings, local and state officials were reacting to an-
nouncements from Washington since the alerts were on 
some occasions issued for particular areas (i.e. New York 
City, Los Angeles). As a result, mayors, governors, police 
commissioners, and others in the emergency response 
communities constituted 7 percent of all sources. 
All in all, television news on specific and general terror 
threats was the domain of American sources (91 percent) 
– only 9 percent of all sources were foreigners. But of these 
non-Americans, bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders 
together represented 5 percent of all foreign and domestic 
sources and were more frequently newsmakers in the threat 
debate than were members of the U.S. Congress. More 
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important, television network news presented bin Laden as 
a news source as often as President Bush, each “capturing” 
a 3 percent share of the total number of sources cited. 
5.2. The Terrorist Threat and Public Opinion 
Terrorism experts agree that modern terrorism began in 
1968, when Palestinian groups began to hijack commercial 
airliners to advertise their grievances against Israel. In the 
following decades, many terrorist incidents targeted citi-
zens of the United States and other countries. As a result 
of anti-American terrorism abroad, four of five Americans 
believed in the second half of the 1980s and in the 1990s 
that terrorist attacks inside the U.S. were very likely or 
somewhat likely. In April 1995, shortly after the Oklahoma 
City bombing, a case of domestic terrorism, 86 percent 
of the American public thought that an act of terrorism 
in the United States within the next twelve months was 
“very likely” (48 percent) or “somewhat likely” (38 percent) 
(Nacos 2006, 261–62). At that time, the terrorism that most 
Americans had in mind was probably of domestic origin, 
not of the international variety. After 9/11, however, the 
focus of public officials, the news media, and presumably 
the public was on international terrorism. When asked 
about the likelihood of another terrorist attack in the 
United States within the next few months, the majority of 
Americans felt consistently that more terrorism was “very 
likely” or “somewhat likely.” In the weeks after 9/11, up to 
88 percent of respondents believed that additional terror-
ist strikes were “very likely” or “somewhat likely” within 
a few months. As time went by without further acts of 
terrorism, there was a downward trend especially in the 
“very likely” category. Thus, by the summer of 2005 and 
early 2006 only 52 percent and 53 percent of the public, 
respectively, thought terrorist attacks within the next few 
months were “very likely” (9 to 10 percent) or “somewhat 
likely” (43 percent).5 When interviewers did not specify a 
time frame for possible terrorist strikes (i.e. “a few months” 
or “soon”) when inquiring about the level of respondents’ 
concerns that there would be more major terrorist attacks 
in the United States, the number of those who said they 
worried “a great deal” declined from 41 percent in early 
October 2001 to 24 percent in August 2005, shortly before 
the fourth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. The number of 
Americans who were “somewhat” or “not too much” wor-
ried increased from 53 percent a few weeks after 9/11 to 65 
percent as the fourth 9/11 anniversary approached. But a 
modicum of worries remained: only between 4 percent 
(several weeks after 9/11) and 10 percent (nearly four years 
after 9/11) of Americans were “not at all” worried about 
another major terror attack in the United States.6 In the 
nearly four years after 9/11, between one third and one 
fourth of all Americans thought it “very likely” that “in 
the near future” another act of catastrophic terrorism 
“causing large numbers of American lives to be lost” would 
occur; between 38 and 46 percent believed that such a 
terrorist catastrophe was “somewhat likely;” and only 3 to 
6 percent were confident that another act of catastrophic 
terrorism was “not likely at all.”7 It is telling that Ameri-
cans’ expectations of catastrophic terrorism in the “near 
future” fluctuated a bit in the years after 9/11 but did not 
subside; on the contrary, in early October 2001, less than a 
month after 9/11, 71 percent of Americans thought another 
incident of catastrophic terrorism was “very likely” or 
“somewhat likely,” and in July 2005, a few days after the 
quadruple suicide attacks on the London transit system, 
75 percent of Americans – 4 percent more than shortly 
after 9/11 – expressed this expectation.8 
While the overwhelming majority of Americans was to one 
degree or another worried about the likelihood of addition-
al terrorism sometime in the future, they were far less con-
cerned that terrorists would strike in their own communi-
ties. In the days following the events of 9/11, about four of 
ten Americans were personally concerned about terrorism 
in the area where they lived. But these sentiments weak-
ened during the next months and years, so that between 
5 This analysis is based on thirty-one national 
surveys conducted by CBS News and the CBS 
News/New York Times polling partnership. The 
first of these polls was conducted in September 
2001 and the last in late January 2006. 
6 We examined thirteen national surveys conduct-
ed by ABC News and ABC News/Washington Post. 
The first of these polls was conducted in October 
2001 and the last in August 2005.
7 Fox/Opinion Dynamics surveys contained the 
same question nine times. The first of these polls 
was conducted in October 2001and the last in July 
2005. 
8 Ibid.
9 This conclusion is based on surveys conducted 
by CBS News and the CBS News/New York Times 
polling partnership. The first of these polls was 
conducted in September 2001 and the last in late 
May 2003.
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two thirds and three fourth of the public were no longer 
worried about terrorism in their own neighborhoods.9 
The story was different for residents of New York City, the 
site of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and 
the complete destruction of the whole World Trade Center 
complex in September 2001. In the spring of 2004, two of 
three residents of New York City were convinced that the 
risk of another terrorist attack was higher in their own 
community than in other big cities around the coun-
try.10 No wonder, then, that the majority of New Yorkers 
remained for years “very worried” or “worried” about 
another major act of terrorism in their city. And while one 
third to one half of Americans around the country said 
they were not worried at all about terrorism in their own 
area, only 9 to 16 percent of New Yorkers were without 
such worries.11 
In the days and weeks immediately following the events of 
9/11 more than half of all Americans were “very worried” 
or “somewhat worried” that they themselves or a member 
of their family would become a victim of terrorism. While 
these personal concerns waned during the following years, 
typically one of three or two of five Americans feared that 
terrorists could harm them or their loved ones. Personal 
concerns about the terror threat seem to rise after major 
terrorist acts and when official terrorism alerts were issued. 
Thus, following the bombings of London’s transit system 
47 percent of Americans were worried about the possibility 
that they or their families could become victims of terror 
strikes whereas only 38 percent expressed these concerns 
before the events in London. After Washington officials 
warned of possible terror attacks in the United States before 
the presidential elections in early 2004, Americans’ level of 
concern about their own well-being and that of their fami-
10 The poll was conducted by the New York Times 
in April 2004. At that time, 65 percent of New 
Yorkers believed their city to be the highest risk 
area in the country and 72 percent said that they 
were very concerned about another terror attack 
in their city.
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11 The Marist College Institute for Opinion Re-
search polled New York City residents on this four 
times from October 2001 to March 2005.
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lies increased from 34 percent in early August to 42 percent 
in early September and 47 percent in mid-October.12
Finally, the American public did not buy into the Bush 
administration’s claim that the Iraq War was part of the 
post-9/11 efforts to rid America and the world of terror-
ism. Instead, at all times after the invasion of Iraq more 
Americans believed that the war had increased the threat 
of terrorism against the United States than that it had 
decreased it. Whereas a majority or plurality of Americans 
thought initially that the terrorist threat had remained the 
same, this changed for good around the first anniversary 
of the Iraq invasion, when more Americans thought that 
the terror threat against America had increased rather 
than remained about the same.
5.3. Dynamics of Public Opinion and the Media
In examining the dynamics of public opinion and the me-
dia we focused on seven questions dealing with the follow-
ing: concern about terrorist attacks over different time hori-
zons at the national level, terrorism affecting one personally, 
terrorism as most the important issue facing the country, 
and approval of President Bush’s performance as president 
in general and his handling terrorism in particular.13 
As we see in figure 4, the boldest line tracking the public’s 
perceptions of terrorism as the most important issue 
facing the country today reveals that since 9/11, unsurpris-
ingly, this perception decreased noticeably (we will discuss 
some of the peaks further below). This trend correlates 
significantly with the trends of the three questions dealing 
with concern about terrorist attacks: great concern about 
major terrorist attacks (r=.77, p<.005), worries about an 
attack occurring soon (r=.51, p<.01), and thinking that an 
attack will occur in the next few months (r=.79, p=.000). 
Interestingly, the correlation with personal worry about 
being a victim of terrorism is much less (r=.41, ns.).14
Figure 5 shows that the public’s belief that terrorism is the 
most important issue facing the country correlates sig-
nificantly with Bush’s approval ratings, in general (r=.736, 
12 See Appendix, question 5.
13 See Appendix for survey items used in figures 4–11.
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Figure 5: Terror threat: Bush approval and terrorism
14 Most of these four questions also correlate no-
ticeably with one another. The correlations are: 
for great concern about major terrorist attacks, 
average r=.596; very worried about an attack 
occurring soon, average r=.457; thinking that an 
attack will occur in the next few months, average 
r=.592; and personal worry, average r=.398
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p<.001) and with regard to terrorism (r=.715, p<.001), 
showing a similar systematic drop every year since 9/11.15
 
We examine these public opinion data more closely for the 
first thirty-nine-month period where we compare them 
with the trends in media (television) reporting or content 
on threats and alerts, and also trends in the threat assess-
ments and terrorist alerts by U.S. administration officials 
that were almost certainly conveyed to, and likely to influ-
ence, the public through the full range of mass media out-
lets. In one instance, we include the timeline for the actual 
video- and audio-taped communications by bin Laden 
during this period. To avoid confusion over the threats 
and alerts that were covered by network news and the 
actual threats and alerts by administration officials and 
the al Qaeda leadership, we refer in the following discus-
sions to “mediated reality” as the complete set of “actual,” 
or “original” statements and pronouncements by admin-
istration officials or bin Laden/al Qaeda. We emphasize 
the most notable effects based on correlation coefficients 
and multiple regression analysis results (treating public 
opinion as the dependent variable and media content and 
actual statements as independent variables).
We first examine the extent to which the news media’s 
coverage of terrorism is related to how the American 
public perceives the graveness of the terrorist threat to the 
United States. We begin with the simple hypothesis that 
the volume of threat coverage affects how the public rates 
terrorism as a major national problem. Since research has 
demonstrated the agenda setting function particularly 
with respect to terrorism (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Norris, 
Kern, and Just 2003; Nacos 1996), one would expect that 
the total volume of mass-mediated threat messages has an 
impact on the public’s perceptions of the importance of 
terrorism as the major national problem. Surprisingly, this 
does not occur in our case. We found that it is not the total 
volume of threat messages that matters but who conveys 
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15 The two Bush approval questions correlate signifi-
cantly with each other (r=.937).
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such messages. On second thought, this finding is less sur-
prising because our measure of the total of mass-mediated 
threat messages represent only a fraction of the complete 
public debate on terrorism. And it is the complete volume 
of reporting on terrorism that has been found to affect the 
public’s agenda. So, what did we find? On the issue of how 
the public ranks terrorism as a major national problem, 
we found that media content and the “mediated reality” 
measure had the strongest impact. Specifically, Presi-
dent Bush’s statements in the media concerning terrorist 
threats and alerts were highly correlated with responses to 
this survey question (r=.63, p<.001). Among all the media 
variables these messages by Bush that were reported on 
television news had a very strong correlation with public 
perceptions, a phenomenon we will see again in relation to 
other aspects of public concern. In addition, statements by 
U.S. administration officials alerting the public to spe-
cific terror threats or speaking about such threats against 
the American homeland in more general terms had the 
strongest impact of all variables in this case (r=.83, p<.001; 
regression coefficient, b=2.69 p<.001). There was, not sur-
prisingly, a strong correlation (r=.62, p<001) between tele-
vision coverage of what President Bush said about terrorist 
threats and alerts and actual threat and alert statements by 
administration officials.
As depicted in Figure 6, all the variables shown decrease 
over time in the same direction and also show increases 
during some of the same short-term periods. When Bush’s 
reactions to and comments about terrorist threats are 
reported in television news and when administration of-
ficials make these statements, the public is more likely to 
perceive terrorism as most important. This happened at 
several time points: In June 2002 the peak in the public’s 
threat perception followed several terrorism alerts the 
previous months, when administration officials initiated a 
heightened state of alert for railroads and other transit sys-
tems and warned of a special threat against the Statue of 
Liberty and the Brooklyn Bridge. Moreover, in early June 
U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft made the dramatic 
announcement that Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen and alleged 
al Qaeda associate, had been arrested while plotting to 
acquire and explode a “dirty bomb” in an American city. 
As television news covered these threat announcements 
heavily, the public’s view of terrorism as a major problem 
for the country increased from 22 percent in May to 33 
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percent in June. It is noteworthy that there was a dearth of 
mass mediated threat messages and actual threat and alert 
statements in the preceding period.
In February 2003, the month before the invasion of 
Iraq, terrorist threat statements by President Bush were 
reported on TV three times, and there were five origi-
nal statements by administration officials during that 
month. The following month, we see a slight increase in 
the public’s perception of terrorism as the most important 
threat (from 10 percent to 13 percent) after a decrease in 
the previous months (from 18 percent to 10 percent). In 
December 2003, when Saddam Hussein was captured, the 
same pattern occurred. One might think that this success 
would lead to a decreased level of threat (no correlation 
was found between these types of messages with responses 
to any of our survey questions) and a smaller percentage 
of people thinking that terrorism is the most important 
issue facing the country. But two heavily covered domestic 
events could have affected the public: First, the chairman 
of the 9/11 Commission, Thomas Kean, said publicly that 
the 9/11 attacks could have been prevented. Three days 
later, Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge raised 
the terror threat alert for the upcoming holidays. Finally, 
in the months before the presidential elections the same 
pattern occurred: from June 2004 (and even earlier) the 
public’s perceptions regarding terrorism as the major 
problem strengthened steadily with a peak in September/
October 2004 – reaching the same level as in November 
2002 (when the American-led coalition had made progress 
in the fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban).16 
In the case of the public’s concern about more major terror-
ist attacks in the U.S, we find that the media had the only 
apparent influence on people’s perceptions. Specifically in 
this case, we identified the influence of TV news anchors, 
correspondents, and reporters describing the terrorist 
threat in general terms or reporting on increases in the level 
of terrorism alerts (r=.54; b=1.20, p<.01). This reframes an 
earlier finding (Page and Shapiro 1992) that identified TV 
news commentary as the strongest influence on the public’s 
policy preferences. In this case media professionals collec-
tively appeared to be potent influences on public attitudes. 
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16 For further elaboration on the patterns around the 
presidential elections, see the questions dealing with 
Bush’s approval.
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Figure 7 shows several concurrent peaks in the trend: 
when media professionals, the “voices of the news,” talk 
about terrorism threats or increased levels of alert, the 
public accepts this and becomes more concerned. This 
occurred particularly around February/March 2003 with 
27 to 29 percent of the public very concerned that another 
major terrorist attack will happen in U.S. (rising from 22 
percent in previous opinion polls). This happened for a 
reason: in February, network TV mentioned the threat of 
terrorism and the increased levels of official alerts twenty-
five times, followed up by six messages in March, when the 
Iraq invasion was launched. The emphasis on the threat 
of terrorism in the media continued reaching a high peak 
of fifty-five threat messages in August 2004, a month later 
25 percent of the public was very concerned about another 
major terrorist attack in the U.S. – two months before the 
presidential election.
When pollsters mentioned a particular time frame asking 
respondents whether they worried that another terrorist 
attack would occur “soon,” we found that the actual state-
ments by U.S. administration officials alerting the public 
to specific terrorist threats or speaking in more general 
terms about the threat had the strongest impact on public 
opinion (r=.49, p<.05; b=1.64 p<=.1). Figure 8 shows that 
the public’s perceptions fluctuated noticeably, as did 
the original statements by officials in a somewhat corre-
sponding pattern. In June 2002, when there were more of-
ficial statements about the terrorist threat and the increase 
in the alert level, the public reacted with a sharp increase 
(from 20 percent in January, the last time the question 
was asked, to 32 percent) in the level of worry. In February 
2003 there were several actual statements by officials fol-
lowing a couple of quiet months, which were followed by a 
sharp increase in the percentage of the Americans reveal-
ing that were very worried about a terrorist attack occur-
ring soon. – with the percentage nearly doubling from 18 
percent in January 2003 to 34 percent in February. 
Next, focusing on the issue of how likely there will be 
another terrorist attack in U.S. within “a few months,” we 
find an apparent impact of both the media’s coverage of 
President Bush’s comments and assessments concerning 
the terrorist threat (r=.58, p<.005) as well as the actual 
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Figure 9: Likelihood of attack in the next few months. October 2001 – December 2004
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statements by U.S. administration officials alerting the 
public to specific terror threats or speaking in more gen-
eral terms (r=.73, p<.001; b=2.86, p<.01). It is interesting to 
note in Figure 9 the corresponding high and low levels in 
all three variables. In June 2002 more people – 36 percent 
compared to 29 percent in May – believed it “very likely” 
that another terrorist attack would happen within the next 
few months. In the same month, there were seven original 
statements by administration officials about the terror-
ist threat and higher alert level (as opposed to an average 
of three or four in the previous months), and television 
news reported one pertinent comment by President Bush. 
Another peak occurred in October-November 2002 with 
27 percent of the public responding that a terrorism attack 
was “very likely” in the next few months; this coincided 
with two actual statements by officials in October followed 
by six such pronouncements in November. In Febru-
ary 2003, 29 percent of the public, up from 14 percent in 
January, believed a terror attack was very likely to happen 
within the next few months. During that time, television 
news carried three threat messages by President Bush and 
administration officials made five actual threat statements. 
Not surprisingly, from July to September 2004, during 
the build-up to the final phase of the presidential election 
campaign, 19 percent of the public, up from 12 percent in 
April, thought it very likely that another terrorist attack 
would happen within a few months. During this time, 
television news frequently carried threat and alert mes-
sages by President Bush, and administration officials made 
similar pronouncements just as often. 
Looking at perceived threats at the personal level, as shown 
in Figure 10, we find a slightly different picture. When it 
comes to the public’s own deepest concerns, it is percep-
tions about Bin Laden that may matter most: specifically, 
the variables related to comments on TV by public officials 
(including President Bush) about threats by bin Laden or al 
Qaeda (r=.44, p<.05); news anchors, correspondents, or re-
porters describing threats by bin Laden or al Qaeda (r=.46, 
p<.05); the actual warnings or threats of more terrorist at-
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tacks by bin Laden and his al Qaeda associates themselves 
(r=.44, p<.05), and U.S officials’ actual statements about the 
threat of terrorism (r=.40, p<.1; b=.781, p<.11). 
Figure 10 shows that even as time passed, a relatively high 
percentage of the public continued to be (very or somewhat) 
worried that they and their loved ones would be affected 
personally by a terrorist attack. Though we see spikes in the 
trend, the overall pattern is fairly steady. It is interesting to 
note that in this case, unlike the others we examined, just 
mentioning bin Laden or al Qaeda in TV news or the ap-
pearance of bin Laden or al Qaeda in tapes seemed to mat-
ter. Apparently, the architects of the 9/11 attacks continued 
to have a hold on the public’s mind, causing people to be 
apprehensive not just about protecting the nation but even 
more so worrying about their and their families’ security 
– although the likelihood of any individual being harmed 
by terrorist attacks is very low. These are very likely emo-
tion-driven responses. When members of the administra-
tion, including President Bush, refer to bin Laden by name 
and this is reported on TV network news, such references 
are often more numerous than the actual communications 
by bin Laden or al Qaeda. 
For example, in April 2002, when two al Qaeda tapes were 
simultaneously released, the TV newscasts we examined 
carried three reactions by administration officials to these 
tapes, and there was one pertinent comment by a media 
professional. Whether connected to the threats on these 
tapes or not, the same month was marked by four actual 
statements by U.S officials announcing an increase in the 
terrorism alert level. A month later, more Americans were 
worried about their personal safety in case of a terrorist 
attack (increasing from 35 percent to 40 percent). When in 
February 2004, a month after al Qaeda released an alleged 
bin Laden audio-tape, several comments were made on 
TV news regarding this communication, and one admin-
istration official issued an actual threat warning, there 
was a sharp increase in the public’s personal fear from 28 
percent to 40 percent. Later, during the election campaign, 
we see similar patterns as described earlier: from August 
to October 2004 the percentage of the public worried 
rose from 34 percent to 47 percent – with nearly half of 
the public expressing concern about becoming a victim 
of terrorism. In September 2004, another bin Laden tape 
surfaced and administration officials spoke about the 
threat of terrorism. In October, the month before the elec-
tions, two bin Laden tapes were released and generously 
covered by the TV networks, and there were two actual 
statements by public officials with respect to a height-
ened threat of terrorism. It is no wonder that Americans 
worried increasingly about their own and their families’ 
vulnerability. 
How did all this affect President Bush’s approval rating? 
First, it appears that both his overall approval ratings and 
the public’s rating of his handling of terrorism were affect-
ed by news reports of President Bush’s statements about 
the terrorist threat and increases in the alert level (overall 
approval: r=.42, p<.05; approval in handling terrorism: 
r=.37, p<.1), and administration officials’ public statements 
on this issue (overall approval: r=.68; p<.01; b=3.93, p<.01; 
approval on terrorism: r=.64, p<.05; b=4.03, p<.01).
As we see in Figure 11, even though the general pattern is 
one of a gradual decrease in both approval ratings (and, 
no doubt, other factors were influencing President Bush’s 
overall approval rating), certain brief spikes in these rat-
ings occur roughly in tandem with increases in the num-
ber of administration statements and news reports citing 
President Bush on the terrorist threat. It seems that as 
long as the administration planted fear in the public, the 
President’s approval ratings benefited. For example, in July 
2002 we found one statement by Bush about the terrorist 
threat reported on television, and there were seven actual 
public statements to this effect by administration officials 
coinciding with a four point increase to 83 percent in the 
President’s rating on handling terrorism. During Septem-
ber/October 2002, this approval declined to 74 percent. In 
September, there were three comments by President Bush 
reported on television during the same months as there 
were four public statements by administration officials em-
phasizing the terrorist threat; this was followed in October 
by only two such statements issued by administration of-
ficials. In contrast, there were six statements the following 
month that preceded a five point increase (to 79 percent) 
in the public’s approval of Bush’s handling of terrorism 
in December 2002. During February 2003, three televi-
sion-reported statements by Bush along with five actual 
statements by administration officials occurred in tandem 
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with a slight increase of three points (to 74 percent) in 
Bush’s terrorism-specific approval. There had not been 
statements of this sort during the preceding months of 
December 2002 and January 2003, when the Bush rating 
dropped by eight points to 71 percent. By April 2003 the 
approval rating for Bush’s handling of terrorism reached 
79 percent. The same pattern occurred for Bush’s overall 
approval as well: an increase from 59 percent in February 
to 65 percent in March 2003 and to 70 percent in April 
2003 as administration officials continued to emphasize 
the terrorist threat during these months, while the public 
rallied to support the President during the invasion of 
Iraq. Moving forward into June and summer 2004, there 
was an increase in TV coverage of Bush’s comments on 
the terrorism threat along with more actual statements 
by administration officials. During this time there was 
an increase in Bush’s public approval for handing terror-
ism from 50 to 57 percent from June to July 2004; Bush’s 
general approval rating increased from 47 percent in May 
to 53 percent in September 2004. 
Overall, then, it seems that emphasizing the terrorist 
threat and official alerts tended to buoy the President’s ap-
proval ratings – both his terrorism-specific rating and his 
overall approval. Further, while it is not surprising that we 
found a correlation between public perceptions of the ter-
rorist threat and mass-mediated or actual terrorism alerts, 
this is a one-sided effect. When it came to reporting about 
the official lowering of terror alert levels, such coverage was 
not prominent – if it occurred at all. One does not have 
to be a cynic to suspect that pronouncements of a relaxed 
state of terrorism threats are not politically beneficial.
6. Discussion
True to the media’s appetite for sensational and dramatic 
“breaking news” to engage their audiences, network TV 
newscasts devoted generous airtime and prominent place-
ments to attention-getting, disconcerting threats com-
municated by Osama bin Laden and his associates on the 
one hand and terrorism alerts issued by administration 
officials on the other. Indeed, television network news 
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– and, no doubt, cable TV, radio, and the print media as 
well – did not simply report this news but magnified it. In 
comparison, the non-dramatic and presumably calming 
news of administration decisions to relax terror alerts was 
under-covered and thus minimized.
 
These coverage patterns arguably played into the hands 
of the al Qaeda leadership whose communications left no 
doubt about its goal to strike fear into Americans. 
But President Bush and others in the administration, too, 
benefited from the prompt and significant coverage of 
their terror alerts and threat assessment thereby continu-
ously reminding the American public why the “war on 
terrorism” had to be fought. It seemed that the White 
House did not in effect mind the prominent coverage of 
bin Laden and al Qaeda threats. Whereas the administra-
tion protested against the airing of bin Laden video-tapes 
by U.S. television outlets shortly after 9/11, no such com-
plaints were filed thereafter. Albeit belatedly, President 
Bush himself told a White House reporter that he believed 
“his 2004 re-election victory over Sen. John Kerry was in-
advertently aided by Osama bin Laden, who issued a taped 
diatribe against him the Friday before Americans went 
to the polls.”17 As the President put it, “I thought it was 
going to help. I thought it would help remind people that 
if bin Laden does not want Bush to be president, some-
thing must be right with Bush.”18 Of course, it was perhaps 
equally or even more likely that bin Laden wanted Bush to 
be re-elected. Not surprisingly, Senator Kerry, too, told an 
interviewer soon after the election that he lost to President 
Bush because of the bin Laden video.19 
After the end of the Cold War, some media scholars 
expected that the disappearance of the long Cold War 
consensus would free the media from the dominance of 
presidents and administration officials in security and 
foreign policy news (Entman 2000; cf. Shapiro and Jacobs 
2000). Since the predominant terrorist threat of our time 
has both international and domestic dimensions, our 
study offers a partial test of the hypothesis of the press’s 
liberation. If there was a short period in which the news 
media were more independent of Washington’s decision-
makers, it did not last past the events of 9/11. Instead, just 
as during the Cold War, authoritative sources (the Presi-
dent, other administration officials, members of Congress, 
state and local officials, former military and government 
figures) were the predominant news sources. 
Americans’ concerns about the threat of terrorism within 
their own borders remained quite high during the post-
9/11 years and actually increased frequently in the wake of 
increases in reporting of threats and terrorism alerts. The 
public’s worries about “catastrophic” terrorism in their 
country were particularly persistent, and in the wake of 
the July 7, 2005, bombings of the London transit system 
it was actually more pronounced than in the weeks after 
the 9/11 attacks. Not surprisingly, New York City residents 
were significantly more worried than their compatriots 
that their community was a more likely target of future 
terrorism than other areas. 
Last, we found strong correlations between mass-mediated 
terror alerts and threat messages and the public’s evalua-
tion of terrorism as the country’s major problem. However, 
it was not the total volume of threat news but rather the 
influence of particular sources that moved public opinion. 
Here, the President and administration officials apparently 
had the greatest effects on Americans’ collective assess-
ment of terrorism as the nation’s top problem. Interest-
ingly, different public perceptions appeared to be affected 
by different news sources. Thus, media professionals’ 
reporting on terror alerts and threats appeared especially 
influential on public concerns about major acts of anti-
American terrorism occurring some time in the future. 
Americans reacted to actual statements by administra-
tion officials when it came to their worries that terrorism 
would happen soon – after all, the administration’s official 
17 Reuters, “Report: Bush says bin Laden aided in 
elections,” February 28, 2006. http://www.msnbc.
com/id/11604530/, accessed June 19, 2006.
18 Ibid.
19 “Exclusive: Kerry Says UBL Tape Cost him 
Election,” Fox News.com, November 21, 2004. 
http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_sto-
ry/0,3566,139060,00.html, accessed June 20, 2006.
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terrorism alerts were covered heavily and were likely to 
be perceived as signaling imminent terrorist attacks. Not 
unexpectedly, bin Laden’s actual threat messages and their 
press coverage affected public opinion as well – especially 
Americans’ concerns that they and their families could 
become the victims of this sort of political violence. 
Whereas bin Laden’s threat messages did not win (nor aim 
for) the sympathies of Americans, President Bush’s overall 
job performance and the public’s rating of his handling of 
terrorism improved in the short term as the result of offi-
cial alerts or threat assessments and related press cover-
age. Revelations by Tom Ridge, who resigned as Secretary 
of Homeland Security in early 2005, suggest that perhaps 
some people in the administration were aware of these 
effects. In an effort to “debunk the myth” of his depart-
ment’s responsibility for repeated terror alerts, Ridge said, 
“There were times when some people were really aggressive 
about raising it [the color-coded terror alert level], and we 
said, ‘For what?’”20
To summarize, then, in the wake of the long lasting 
“media event” of 9/11, both bin Laden with other al Qaeda 
leaders and President Bush with other administration 
officials utilized the mass media to communicate their 
propaganda of fear. By over-covering in particular the 
frequent “fear messages” by administration officials, the 
media contributed to what one critic described as “creat-
ing a culture of hysteria” (Kellner 2005, 28), or what one 
might call a climate of fear that conditioned Americans 
to rally around the President and his “war on terrorism.” 
At the same time, the media “served in a perverse way as 
instruments of al Qaeda and terrorism, since one of the 
goals of terror attacks is to spread fear and anxiety” (Kell-
ner 2005, 28). 
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